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Abstract
The last two decades show an trend towards a less equal income distribution in OECD. There are many
causes for this trend. This paper analysis whether changes in social security systems are one of these
causes. For some OECD-countries we find a relationship between changing welfare state policies (as
measured by expenditure ratios and replacement rates) and changing income inequality, but for others not.
Especially the United Kingdom and the Netherlands combined an above average rise in inequality with a
reduction in the generosity of the welfare system.
For this reason we studied the case for the Netherlands in more detail. A budget incidence analysis for the
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income inequality.
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21 Introduction
In recent years considerable progress has been made in empirical research on income
inequality in industrialized countries (see e.g. Gottschalk et al. 1997). An important development
has been the launching of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) in which micro data sets from
various countries have been harmonized. Thus there are good possibilities for studying how
income inequality varies cross-countries (see Atkinson et al. 1995). However, the advancement
in methods of measurement and in empirical knowledge is contrasted with the lack of insight
into causes for differences in equality over time (Gustafsson & Johansson, 1999). This should
perhaps not come as a surprise as the distribution of income in a country is the outcome of
numerous decisions made by households, firms, organizations and the public sector. One could
think of an almost infinite number of micro-level causes for differences and changes in income
inequality (Gottschalk & Smeeding, 1997; Atkinson et al. 1995).
In this paper, we investigate whether social policy measures have contributed to changes in
inequality among OECD countries. Our hypothesis is that reforms of the social system, such
as benefit cuts or more strict eligibility criteria, have made the income distribution more
unequal. Of course, this is only the case when (pre-reform-) social transfers are mainly
directed at lower income groups (or when the transfers to lower income groups are cut more
than the transfers to higher income groups). When, on the other hand, the benefits of the
welfare system are rather evenly spread between income groups, reforms will not have a
strong impact on income (re)distribution.
Using comparative international time-series data we will analyze whether there is some
correlation between changes in social expenditures and welfare generosity, and changes in
the income distribution. A more detailed study will be performed for the Netherlands, which is
an interesting case, because the Dutch welfare system has been reformed rather
fundamentally in recent years. Also income inequality has increased relatively more than in
most other OECD countries (Gottschalk & Smeeding, 1998). We use the traditional budget
incidence approach to study the combined effects of all taxes and transfers on the income
(re)distribution. The distribution of primary or wage and salary income is compared with the
distribution of income after tax and after social transfers.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we summarize literature on the (changes in the)
income distribution in OECD countries. In section 3 we investigate the proposition that social
policy is one of the causes of increasing inequality. Section 4 presents a more detailed budget
incidence approach for the Netherlands. Section 5 concludes the paper. Details on the
comparative databases used are listed in Annex A.
32   Empirical Evidence
2.1   Data on Income Inequality
Data availability, data consistency, and many factors in different studies make it hard to
compare levels or even trends of income inequality across countries (differences in income
concepts, the income units, (summary) measures, equivalence adjustments and other factors).1
The most promising tool to analyze changes in the income distribution are high quality time-
series panel data. However, cross-national studies based on several years of panel data are
just beginning to appear (see e.g. Headey et al. 1997).2 Second-best seems the cross-
nationally comparable collection of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). LIS was created
specifically to improve consistency across countries. The LIS data are a collection of micro
data sets obtained from the range of income surveys in various countries. The advantage of
these data is that extensive effort has been made by country specialists to make information
on income and household characteristics as comparable as possible across a large number of
countries. The LIS data sets can be used to compare the distribution of disposable income in
25 nations over a 20-year period, though not all periods are available for all nations.3
2.2   Differences in Inequality across OECD Countries
This section reviews the evidence on cross national comparisons of annual disposable
income inequality over twenty wealthy nations. The analysis is mainly descriptive and relies on
the empirical evidence from Gottschalk & Smeeding (1997 and 1998), and others using data
from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).4 We summarize empirical results by both analyzing
absolute levels and trends of income inequality across countries. We start by comparing levels
(around the mid 1990's) and short-run trends in inequality (1980’s) and then shift to trends from
1979 onwards.
¾ Levels of Income Inequality around the mid 1990's
Levels of inequality can be shown in several ways, e.g. by Lorenz curves, specific points on
the percentile distribution (P10 or P90), decile ratios (P90/P10), and Gini coefficients or many
other summary statistics of inequality. All (summary) statistics of inequality can be used to
rank income inequality in OECD countries, but they do not always tell the same story.
Table 1 shows two summary measures of the income distribution - the P90/P10-ratio and the
Gini coefficient. Countries are listed in order of their P90/P10-ratio from smallest to largest.
4Table 1  Summary Measures of  the Income Distribution
Country P90 /P10 -ratio Gini coefficient
Sweden 1995 2.59 0.222
Finland 1995 2.68 0.226
Belgium 1992 2.76 0.230
Norway 1995 2.84 0.240
Denmark 1992 2.84 0.240
Luxembourg 1994 2.92 0.235
Netherlands 1994 3.08 0.282
Germany 1994 3.18 0.300
France 1994 3.32 0.290
Taiwan 1995 3.36 0.277
Switzerland 1982 3.39 0.323
Canada 1994 3.90 0.286
Spain 1990 3.96 0.306
Israel 1992 4.12 0.305
Japan 1992 4.17 0.315
Ireland 1987 4.20 0.330
Australia 1994 4.22 0.317
United Kingdom 1995 4.52 0.346
Italy 1995 4.68 0.346
United States 1997 5.64 0.375
note: Data refer to adjusted disposable income based on data from LIS; Gini coefficients are based on income which are
bottom-coded at 1 percent of median disposable income and top coded at 10 times the median disposable income.
source: Gottschalk & Smeeding (2000: figure 1, p. 211)
The highest inequality is found in the United States, while Nordic countries are the most equal
nations. Although other inequality indices would alter the country-ranking to some extent,
roughly the same pattern of overall inequality is observed in other analyses of inequality
(Atkinson et al. 1995)
We see that according to the Gini coefficient, The Netherlands is grouped with four other
countries (Luxembourg, Germany, France, and Taiwan) with quite low coefficients compared
to Switzerland, Canada, Spain, Israel, and Japan with somewhat larger coefficient, and five
other countries with the largest coefficients, indicating the highest degree of inequality.
Table 1 indicate that a wide range of inequality exists across rich nations, with the nation with
the highest inequality coefficient (United States) almost twice as high as the nation with the
lowest coefficient (Sweden).
¾ Trends in Income Inequality during the 1980’s
Table 2 summarizes the results of cross-national comparisons of earnings and income inequality.
Note that disposable income is equal to market income plus transfers minus taxes. So, table 2
gives some information on social policy as well. Countries have been listed in order of changes in
disposable income inequality as measured by the change in the Gini coefficient from largest to
smallest change. It should, however, be noted that this country-ranking depends rather strongly
on the inequality index used (Gini) and the specific time-intervals applied. Any (small) difference in
specification could alter both the magnitude of inequality and the country-ranking to an wide
5extend. However, the direction of the changes in inequality in the period 1980-1995 as shown in
Table 2 is more or less in line with results of other analyses (cf. Ruiz-Huerta et al. 1999). As far as
disposable income is concerned, it is certainly wrong to think in terms of a world-wide trend
towards increased income inequality in the 1980’s (cf. Atkinson, 1996: 43).
Table 2   Changes in Market and Disposable Income Inequality During the 1980’s
Country years market income inequality disposable income inequality
United Kingdom 1981 - 91 +++ ++++
United States 1980 - 93 +++ +++
Sweden 1980 - 93 +++ +++
Australia 1980 - 90 + +
Denmark 1981 - 90 + +
New Zealand 1981 - 89 + +
Japan 1981 - 90 + +
The Netherlands 1981 - 89 + +
Norway 1982 - 89 + +
Belgium 1985 - 89 + +
Canada 1980 - 92 + 0
Israel 1979 - 92 + 0
Finland 1981 - 92 +++ 0
France 1979 - 89 0 0
Portugal 1980 - 90 0 0
Spain 1980 - 90 n.a. 0
Ireland 1980 - 87 + 0
West Germany 1983 - 90 + 0
Italy 1977 - 91 - -
note: Change is based Gini coefficient of disposable income (income concept, method of equivalence scale and computation may
differ by country). Designation Range of change in Gini coefficient
- -5 percent or more
0 -4 to +4 percent
+ 5 to 10 percent
++ 10 to 15 percent
+++ 16 to 29 percent
++++ 30 percent ore more
methodology: the above result emerges from extensive reading and interpretation of comparative studies of the level and trend
in inequality by Gottschalk & Smeeding
source: Gottschalk & Smeeding (1997, table 4, p. 666)
The extensive survey by Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) covers many aspects of income
inequality. The following stylized facts can be traced from their study:
I Almost all countries experienced some increase in wage inequality during the 1980’s. Changes
in household income inequality in most countries were smaller than changes in earnings
inequality. In all OECD-countries post-tax and transfer disposable income is more equally
distributed than market income.
II Changes in taxes paid and transfers received - due to changes in tax and transfer structures in
many countries - largely offset the changes in the distribution of markets income (pre-tax and
pre-transfer).
III However, the changes in the distribution of income are the result of a complicated set of forces.
The links between changes in tax and transfer policy and the distribution of disposable income
in different countries are not well understood at this stage.
6¾ Trends in Income Inequality: 1979-1995
When we turn to long-run trends in inequality, the picture as set in table 2, alters substantially for
several countries. We rely on data from another paper by Gottschalk & Smeeding (1998) who
list countries in order of yearly percentages changes in disposable income inequality (as
measured by the change in the Gini coefficient) from largest to smallest change. Disposable
income inequality increased dramatically in a number of countries, but this trend was not
universal. Income inequality did not rise in 5 of the 17 nations examined from 1979 to 1995. See
figure 1.
Figure 1 Trends in Disposable Income Inequality 1979-1995
Average Percentage Change of Gini Coefficient per Year
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note: Average percentage change per year equals the percentage change in the Gini coefficient over the time frame indicated
divided by the number of years in the interval.
source: Gottschalk & Smeeding (1998, figure 4,  p.56 and appendix tables A-2, p.64); and own calculations
Inequality increased by more than 1 percent a year in five countries over this period. The United
Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Australia are on top of the list in descending
order. Compared to table 2, the United States fall back dramatically, while e.g. the Netherlands
show a remarkably sharp increase. Moreover, household income inequality increased in
several countries in the period 1979-1995, but the timing of changes was markedly different.
2.3   Conclusion
While even the LIS-data are by no means perfect, they produce some consistent patterns.
The range of income inequality in OECD countries seems very wide at any point in time. The
Gini coefficient in the most unequal country (United States) is almost twice as large as that
found in the most equal country (Sweden). Income inequality has increased dramatically in a
number of countries, particularly in the United Kingdom, but also in The Netherlands,
7Denmark, Sweden, Australia, and seven other nations. While income inequality rose in 12 of
the 17 nations examined from 1980 to 1995, this trend was not universal. In almost all
countries inequality declined through the 1970s and started to increase in the 1980s and
1990s. Country specific trends in income inequality are more similar, though not universally
so. The large majority of nations have experienced rising income inequality over the last
decade or longer.
3   The Role of Social Policies
3.1   Causes of change. Is it social policy?
The increasing income inequality observed for most – but not all – Western economies over the
last decades has coincided with many structural changes in the economic system. The world
economy has been hit by oil crises twice, there has been a tendency towards more free market
oriented policies, and more women have been participating in the labor market. For many
countries the main forces behind growing disposable income inequality are the growth of
inequality of earned market income, demographic changes, changes in household size and
composition, and other endogenous factors. Atkinson (2000: 17) concludes that we should not
expect the same development in all countries, because the distribution of income is subject to a
wide variety of forces. The evolution of income inequality is not simply the product of common
economic forces: it also represents the impact of institutions and national policies. We focus on
social policy to that end, and look for a relationship, if any, between social policy and income
inequality.
One could argue that one of the explanations of the dissimilarity in country-ordering in table 2
compared to figure 1 could be the welfare state reform. In some countries the welfare state (tax
and transfer systems) has been reformed rather drastically in recent years. Cutting back public
spending and increasing income inequality could be correlated.
On basis of the LIS-data presented by Ervik (1998) we find mixed evidence. Ervik presents for
eight countries the trend in the Gini coefficients corresponding with several income concepts;
moving from earned market income, via gross income (also including social transfers) to net
disposable income (gross income minus social contributions and taxes). For any year (and
country) the magnitude of welfare states’ total redistributive effort is represented by the
reduction of the Gini coefficient between market income and net disposable income (p.30). This
budget incidence approach indicates that the tax and transfer system does redistribute income
in such a way that a substantial reduction in overall income inequality is accomplished in all of
the eight countries under consideration. How did this distributing effort by social policy vary over
time in different countries? In some countries the redistributive effect of transfers and taxes
decreased in the last ten to fifteen years (Sweden, the United Kingdom, Finland and the United
States), whereas in other countries the redistributive effect of transfers and taxes increased
(Denmark, Australia, Germany and Norway). However, this study does not deal with the
possible relationship between welfare state policies and changes in the income distribution.
83.2   Empirical Evidence from a Straightforward Approach
How do we measure changes in social policy or changes in "generosity" of social security
systems? A range of indicators are used in comparative studies (Whiteford, 1995). We look at
only two of these indicators in our straightforward approach (see also sections 4 and 6); (a)
social security expenditures as percentage of GDP, and (b) replacement rates of unemployment
benefits.
Social Security Transfers as percentage of GDP
It’s well known that social security systems are very difficult to compare. Countries often use
different definitions of social security and of specific social risks, such as unemployment or
disability. Moreover, benefits may be provided by either public institutions or market institutions.
In the latter case, market provision may be regulated by government in such a way as to make it
equivalent to public provision. These different forms of social protection may not be included
consistently in national statistics. A specific statistical problem is related to the tax treatment of
social benefits. In some countries benefits are taxable as a rule, in others not.  Also, benefits
can take the form of tax relief. These tax features can make a big difference in the statistics.
Also, changes in expenditure ratios often do not reflect policy changes. Higher outlays can
simply be the result of aging, rising unemployment, etceteras. Expenditure ratio’s can thus only
be considered as rough indicators of welfare state policies.
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) use this indicator to analyze the impact of social policy in the
1980’s. They conclude that there is a noticeable correlation between public cash transfer
expenditures and disposable income inequality. While the level of social spending is negatively
correlated with changes in income inequality, they fount little relationship between retrenchment and
increases in inequality in most countries (p. 673). Reductions in social welfare spending for the non-
aged and regressive changes in the structure of income taxes for some countries during the 1980's
account for only a small part of the trend in post-tax and transfer inequality in most nations.
Following Gottschalk and Smeeding, we look at expenditure ratios for a somewhat longer period.
Table 3 shows that in almost all modern welfare states social security transfers as percentage of
GDP rose in the period 1979-1994. Using the Comparative Welfare State Data Set (LIS/OECD),
we found only two countries with a non-positive change in social security transfers over this time
interval: Germany and the Netherlands.
9Table 3   Social Security Transfers as percentage of GDP
around 1979 around 1994 totalchange
average
annual change
Australia 81-94 19.5  21.8 +2.3 +0.18
Canada 79-94 9.6 15.2 +5.6 +0.37
Denmark 81-94 17.8  22.0 +4.2 +0.32
Finland 79-94 9.4 25.1 +15.7  +1.05
France 80-93 18.6  23.3 +4.7 +0.31
Germany 79-94 16.5  16.1 -0.4 -0.03
Ireland 80-93 12.6  15.4 +2.8 +0.22
Italy 79-94 15.7 19.5 +3.8 +0.25
Japan 79-93 9.8 12.1 +2.3 +0.16
Netherlands 79-94 25.5  25.5   0.0   0.00
Norway 79-94 15.5  20.5 +5.0 +0.42
Sweden 79-94 17.6  24.9 +7.3 +0.49
Switzerland 82-92 13.2  15.9 +2.7 +0.27
United Kingdom 79-94 11.1  15.4 +4.3 +0.29
United States 79-93 10.0  13.2 +3.2 +0.23
average (unweighted) 14.8  19.1 +4.3 +0.30
note: total change equals the change in social security transfers as percentage of GDP over the time frame indicated; average
annual change is total change divided by the number of years in the interval
source: Comparative Welfare State Data Set LIS / OECD (http://lissy.ceps.lu/compwsp.htm); and own calculations
The expansion of social security systems and/or safety nets in most countries mitigated the
observed trend of increasing (market) income inequality to some extent during the period under
consideration. Although for most countries both income inequality and social security transfers
rose (this seems to contradict with our hypothesis), the growth rates of social security transfers
show variation across countries. Rising inequality in some countries could be associated with a
below average change in social security transfers as percentage of GDP. This is analyzed in
figure 2.
We have plotted the average percentage change of social security transfers as percentage of
GDP and the average percentage change in the Gini coefficient for countries, where both data-
items are available. Both averages are calculated over the period indicated (total change divided
by the number of years in the interval) and are represented by the cross of both axes: 0.67 for
Gini and social security transfers rose on average approximately 0.3 percentage-points per year
among these fifteen countries. Several countries show growth rates in social security transfers
above this average: Canada, France, and the four Nordic countries. Other countries show below
average growth rates: Australia, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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Figure 2 Cross Country Changes in Social Security Transfers and Gini index 1979-1994
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The plotted results for the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Japan, and Australia seem in
line with our hypothesis. These countries combine an above average rise in income inequality
with a below average growth rate of social security transfers over the time interval indicated.
Furthermore, Norway, Canada, France, and Finland combined an above average growth rate
in social security transfers with a below average rise in income inequality. However, for the
other countries we do not find a noticeable negative correlation between the change in the
level of social security transfers and disposable income inequality. Especially Sweden and
Denmark combine both an above average growth rate in social security transfers with a
relatively large rise in income inequality. Note that a weak positive relationship between social
security transfers and inequality can also be the result of the fact that social security transfers
are not well-targeted towards the poor.
Replacement Rates
Comparative studies of social security systems have increasingly turned to the use of
replacement rates as measures of the level of benefits in different countries and therefore of the
degree of social protection offered by different welfare systems. However, also replacement
rates can only be seen as limited indicators of the generosity of benefit systems (Whiteford,
1995). Some of the limitations are: 1) replacement rates are based on entitlement rules and
often represent only the maximum payment available in the circumstances specified; 2) benefits
are often not fully indexed, implying that benefits represent a decreasing percentage of wages;
3) not all relevant benefits may be reckoned with (such as housing subsidies or health care); 4)
taxation can blur the picture; and 5) to monitor social policy developments in the OECD area,
one should calculate a variety of replacement rates (differentiated to e.g. social security
schemes, earnings levels, family situations, duration of spells). Bearing these limitations in mind,
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we can look at figure 3, which presents only the gross replacement rates for unemployment
benefits for 21 OECD countries in 1985 and 1997. All replacement rate calculations are based
on the level of previous earnings defined with reference to the Average Production Worker
(APW), taking as the two most significant cases the APW level of earnings and two thirds of the
APW level of earnings.
Figure 3   Gross Replacement Rates Unemployment Benefits OECD 1985 and 1997
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are ranked in descending order of this average in 1997.
Explanation: Benefit entitlements have been estimated for two earnings levels (average earnings and two-thirds of average
earnings), three family situations (single, with dependent spouse, with spouse in work) and three durations of
unemployment spells (one year, 2 to 3 years, 4 to 5 years out of work). For every datayear between 1961 and 1997
the unweighted averages of these replacement rates are computed. The computations assume standard
circumstances such as 40 years of age, involuntary loss of the former job, long previous work record, etc.
source: OECD (data provided by Glenn Cooper)
Seven countries show a decline in the replacement rates in the period 1985-1997: the
Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden. All
these countries are faced with an increasing income inequality as measured by the Gini
coefficient (figure 1). This gives some support for our hypothesis.
In line with figure 2 we have plotted the average percentage change of the gross replacement
rates and the average percentage change in the Gini coefficient for countries, where both data-
items are available for the time interval indicated. Again, both axes cross at these averages:
0.67 for Gini and the replacement rose on average approximately 2 percentage-points per year
among these countries. Figure 4 shows some indications that support our hypothesis. A
negative relationship between the change in replacement rates and the change income
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inequality can be found for the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Other countries with a
relatively sharp increase in income inequality (Sweden and Denmark) show relatively modest
positive changes in the replacement rates. However, it is certainly wrong to think in terms of a
world-wide explanation for the upward trend towards increased income inequality since the
1980’s.
Figure 4   Changes in Gross Replacement Rates and Gini Index, around 1979 and 1994
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3.3   Relationship
The comparative data used in the analysis above are by no means perfect. They do not
accurately indicate (the direction of) changes in social policy. The material presented is only
descriptive, does not explain changes in the household income distribution, and therefor can not
establish a causal relationship between changes in social policy and changes in the income
distribution. Obviously, this straightforward analysis is much to simple to draw far-reaching
conclusions.
Nevertheless, for some countries the data produce patterns for the period 1979-1994, which
are consistent with our hypothesis; for others not though. Especially the UK and the
Netherlands are interesting cases: these countries combine a relatively large increase in
inequality with lower replacement rates and for the Netherlands also a non-positive change in
the expenditure ratio. These are indications that support our hypothesis on a negative
relationship between changes in income inequality and changes in social policies. A much
more elaborate country-approach is needed, however, to be more conclusive, which we
attempt for the case of the Netherlands.
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4   A Budget Incidence Analysis for the Netherlands
4.1   Social Security Reform
The Dutch social protection system used to be characterized by generous open-ended benefits
and lax administrative control. However, the expansion of the system caused severe and
growing problems, starting in the 1970’s. The number of benefit recipients and the financial
burden of inactivity rose dramatically, as can be seen in table 4. Combined with a number of
adverse macroeconomic shocks, a vicious cycle of increasing (non-wage) labor costs, erosion
of employment and growing benefit dependency was set in motion. Reform of the social system
was called for and was indeed initiated in the early 1980’s. Actually, the change in policy stance
occurred at a relatively early stage, compared to other European countries, because of the
severity of the problems (Bovenberg, 2000).
Table 4  Key Figures on Social Security in the Netherlands
1970 1980 1990 1999
Public expenditure on social security as % GDP a 17.2 26.4 25.8 20.7
Number of benefit recipients in millions 2.0 3.1 4.0 4.1
Same under age 65 0.7 1.4 2.0 1.9
Benefit recipients as % of employment 45 66 82 69
Real disposable income of welfare and old age
benefits (index: 1973 = 100) 124 114 112
a Excluding supplementary labor pensions and housing subsidies, including public expenditure on health care
source: Ministry of Social Affairs (1995, p. 5) and (1999)
In the 1980’s reform strategy was almost exclusively directed at cutting benefit levels. The
(legally required) indexation of social benefits to wage development was suspended during
almost the entire 1980’s and partly in the first half of the 1990’s. Actually, in many years no
adjustment for inflation took place, that is benefits were frozen in nominal terms. Also,
unemployment and disability benefits were cut from 80 percent to 70 percent of previous wages.
As a consequence of these and other measures, real disposable income of many beneficiaries
strongly fell since 1980, as shown in table 4.5 The strategy was successful in containing
expenditure growth. Public expenditure on social protection roughly stabilized in the 1980's,
despite continuing growth of benefit volumes.
In the 1990’s the reform strategy has been primarily directed at reducing the number of
beneficiaries, through encouraging labor force participation, and discouraging and preventing
benefit dependency. Important policy measures in this context have been the tightening of
eligibility requirements in the unemployment and disability schemes, reform of the benefit
administration, and the introduction of stronger financial incentives for employees and –
especially – employers. The sickness benefit scheme has been privatized in the period 1994-
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1996, which means that employers are now fully responsible for paying sickness benefits of 70
percent of wages during the first year of sick leave. This risk can be privately insured, which has
actually occurred on a large scale. The disability scheme has also been changed fundamentally,
through the introduction of experience rating. Also, the option was introduced for employers to
private coverage of the disability risk during the first five years of disability. Radical changes
have been made in the survivors scheme. Most people are now expected to privately insure
against the risk of disease of relatives.
The reduction in statutory benefits have been offset mostly, because trade unions have
negotiated supplementary benefits, especially sickness benefits and disability benefits.
However, employees (and others) not taking part in these collective contracts do not profit from
this.
The figures in table 4 show that these policies had some success in terms of a halting the rise in
claimants under 65 years, but so far the rising trend has not been clearly reversed. A more
positive development is that the ratio of benefit recipients to the number of employed is falling in
recent years, as a consequence of rapid employment growth. Also, total expenditure on social
security is declining in recent years. It goes without saying, however, that the reforms discussed
will have a substantial impact on the income distribution. This will be analyzed in section 4.3.
4.2   Methodology
Social security schemes in the Netherlands, as in many countries, make low income earners
better off after social policy than before. In general, income is transferred from high income
earners to poor ones trough taxes and transfers. We analyze the effect of social policy on the
distribution of income in line with the work of Musgrave et al. (1974). The distribution of primary
or wage and salary income is compared with the distribution of income after tax and after social
transfers. Summary statistics of income inequality before and after social policy are used to
indicate the amount of distribution by social policy (cf. Ervik, 1998, and Duclos, 2000). Our
measure of the redistributive impact of social security on inequality is straightforwardly based on
a formula developed by Kakwani (1986) and Ringen (1991):
Redistribution by government = (primary income – disposable income) / (primary income)
This formula is used to estimate the reduction in inequality produced by social security, where
primary income inequality is given by a summary statistic of pre-tax, pre-transfer incomes and
disposable income inequality is given by the same summary statistic of disposable equivalent
incomes. The measures of both pre- and post-social security income are fare from ideal. At a
conceptual level, no conceivable measure of pre-social security income could indicate what the
income distribution would look like if social security did not exist.
The unit of analysis is an important issue in income distribution studies. Equivalence scales are
widely used.6 In our analysis for the Netherlands we use the results obtained by other
researchers, where equivalence scale elasticity is around 0.5 (cf. most OECD-studies).
Moreover, we analyze data for a long time period in which data-consistency for the adjustments
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for household size and composition for market income is troublesome. For this reason we
separately analyze the whole trajectory from original or market income to net disposable income
with non-adjusted incomes to approach the impact of the tax and benefit system as part of the
overall trend in income distribution.
We use the Mean Log Deviation (Theil index) as a summary measure of income inequality. It
is generally agreed upon that this statistic is best suited to identify components of the change
in inequality, that is for assessing the impact of taxes and benefits on inequality. The lower
this statistic the more equal is the distribution. Mean Log Deviation can be meaningfully added
and subtracted from another in a way that most other indices of inequality cannot. Of course,
many other summary measures can be found in the literature and all imply some a priori value
judgements about the distribution itself.
The important issue of tax/transfer shifting is totally ignored in analyses on budget incidence in
such a classical framework. However, models that include all behavioral links are beyond the
scope of existing empirical work (Gottschalk & Smeeding, 1998: 3). Therefore, researchers
have restricted themselves largely to accounting exercises which decompose changes in
overall inequality into a set of components. Despite the problem of tax shifting, analyses on
statutory and budget incidence can be found for decades in literature on public finance.7
4.3   Results
We perform a budget incidence analysis for the period 1981-1997, because we measure the
lowest level of inequality in the early 1980’s (as most studies for the Netherlands do). Inequality
especially rose during the 1980’s. We analyze the trajectory from primary income to adjusted
disposable income. Table 5 illustrates the main characteristics of the trend in inequality in the
Netherlands.
As expected, adjusted disposable incomes are distributed much more equally than primary
incomes. In the years shown, inequality was reduced by some 80 percent. By far the largest part
of the overall reduction in inequality (about 60 percentage points) is due to social transfers.
Note, however, that the redistributive effect of transfers has become smaller in the period under
consideration. Taxes and social security contributions reduce inequality by some 7 to 10
percentage points. Finally, the use of equivalence scales reduces inequality by another 10
percentage points.
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Table 5  Decomposition of Inequality in Household Income: Mean Log Deviation
level change share in change
1981 1991 1997 1981-1997 1981-1997
Primary income 0.532 0.540 0.545 +0.013 36%
  effect transfers -0.334 -0.324 -0.320 +0.014 39%
Gross income 0.198 0.216 0.225
  effect taxes -0.054 -0.040 -0.045 +0.009 25%
Disposable income 0.144 0.176 0.180 +0.036 100%
  adjustment for household size
  and composition -0.048 -0.057 -0.056 -0.008
Disposable income equivalence scale 0.096 0.119 0.124 +0.028
source:
Data on the partial effects of transfers and taxes for 1981 are from Odink (1985); for 1991 from Jeurissen (1995) and
for 1997 are own calculations. The partial effects of household size and composition are taken from Trimp (1993) and
De Kleijn (1998). The data mentioned did not (always) correspond. For all data years we have postulated the same
income concepts and used the same income units as Jeurissen (i.e. definitions from before a major tax reform in
1990) to arrive identical decomposition of income inequality for all data-years. Thereafter we re-weighted the partial
effects (of taxes, transfers and household size and decomposition). Because of these transformations values in the
table will differ from values as presented by Statistics Netherlands (and other studies).
Which are the main factors behind the changes in the income distribution? These are shown in
the right part of table 5. In the period considered, the Mean Log Deviation for  disposable
income increased by 36 points, which is equivalent to a rise in overall inequality by 25 percent
(29 percent when adjusted income is taken).
A major force behind the rise in overall inequality of disposable household income is a more
unequal distribution of primary income (13 points or 36% of the total change). This is partly
caused by the strong rise in the labor force participation of secondary earners (women). Another
factor behind the increase in inequality is lower progressivity of the tax system (9 points or
25%).8 But social transfers explain the largest part of the total increase in inequality (39%).9
We conclude that the change in social policies since the early 1980’s has indeed made the
income distribution less equal. Social transfers are a main force behind the rise in overall
income inequality. It should be noted, however, that our results are only rough estimates (which
depend rather strongly on the data used) given the limitations of the budget incidence method.
Including the effect of behavioral responses would probably provide a different result. Transfers
cuts have reduced replacement ratios which has stimulated labor force participation of benefit
recipients.10 This may have reduced income inequality. Moreover, one would analyze some
effects in more detail (by scheme), e.g. the effect of shifting responsibility for social schemes
from state to market institutions. Our analyses indicate that the reforms of the Dutch social
system have made the Dutch income distribution more unequal overall. However, the partial
effects of reforms of specific social schemes on inequality may have been dissimilar,
depending on the altered conditions on benefits and eligibility (retrenchment or not) and the
targeting of the pre- and post-reform social scheme (transfers mainly directed to lower or
higher income groups).
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5   Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated whether changes in the overall distribution of incomes in OECD
countries can be attributed to social policy measures. Income inequality rose in 12 out of 17
OECD countries since the early 1980’s. In some countries this rise was rather dramatic,
especially in the United Kingdom and in Sweden and - to a lesser extent- in Denmark and the
Netherlands. For some countries we find a relationship between changing welfare state policies
(as measured by expenditure ratios and replacement rates) and changes in income inequality,
but for others not. Especially the United Kingdom and the Netherlands combined and above
average rise in inequality with a reduction in the generosity of the welfare system.
We performed a more elaborated country approach for the case of the Netherlands, which is
interesting because this country combined a relative sharp increase in income inequality with a
quite fundamental reform of the welfare state. We used the traditional budget incidence
approach – despite some methodological problems – to study the combined effects of all taxes
and transfers on the income (re)distribution. The distribution of primary or wage and salary
income is compared with the distribution of income after tax and after social transfers. Summary
statistics of income before and after social policy are used to indicate the redistributive effect of
social policy. We find that inequality of disposable household income increased in the period
1981-1997 by roughly 25 percent as measured by the Mean Log Deviation. Almost 40 percent 
of the increase in inequality can be attributed to transfers. Our budget incidence analyses
indicates that social security reforms have had an important impact on increasing income
inequality in the Netherlands.
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Annex A   Comparative database: availability data around 1979 and 1994
database 1 database 2 database 3 database 4 database 5
COUNTRIES
income
inequality
around 1995
trend in
income inequality
around 1979-1995
gross
replacement
rates
comparative
welfare state
data set
gross social
transfers
as % of GNP
qualified
LIS LIS OECD LIS / OECD OECD Economic
Outlook
1 Austria n.a. n.a. x x x no
2 Australia x x x x x yes
3 Belgium x n.a. x x x no
4 Canada x x x x x yes
5 Denmark x x x x x yes
6 Finland x x x x x yes
7 France x x x x x yes
8 Germany x x x x x yes
9 Greece n.a. n.a. x n.a. x no
10 Israel x x n.a. n.a. n.a. no
11 Ireland x x x x x yes
12 Italy x x x x x yes
13 Japan x x x x x yes
14 Luxembourg x n.a. n.a. x n.a. no
15 Netherlands x x x x x yes
16 New Zealand x n.a. x x n.a. no
17 Norway x x x x x yes
18 Portugal n.a. n.a. x n.a. x no
19 Spain x n.a. x n.a. x no
20 Sweden x x x x x yes
21 Switzerland x x x x x yes
22 Taiwan x x n.a. n.a. n.a. no
23 United Kingdom x x x x x yes
24 United States x x x x x yes
coverage 21 17 21 19 21 15
sources:
database 1: Gottschalk & Smeeding (2000, figure 1, p. 211)
database 2: Gottschalk & Smeeding (1998, figure 4, p. 56 and appendix tables A-2, p. 64)
database 3: OECD (data provided by Glenn Cooper, May 2000)
database 4: Comparative Welfare State Data Set LIS / OECD (internet http://lissy.ceps.lu/compwsp.htm)
database 5: Data Set OECD Economic Outlook (December 1998)
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Trends in disposable income inequality Gini coefficient  Index Gini (1979=100)
year 1: year 2: number of years index annual % change
Australia 1981 1990 9 1.0730 0.81
Canada 1979 1995 16 1.0056 0.04
Denmark 1981 1990 9 1.1136 1.26
Finland 1979 1994 15 0.9858 -0.09
France 1979 1994 15 1.0820 0.55
Germany 1979 1995 16 1.0827 0.52
Ireland 1980 1994 14 0.9830 -0.12
Italy 1979 1995 16 0.9556 -0.28
Japan 1979 1993 14 1.1250 0.89
Netherlands 1979 1994 15 1.1731 1.15
Norway 1979 1995 16 1.0760 0.48
Sweden 1979 1994 15 1.2837 1.89
Switzerland 1982 1992 10 1.0632 0.63
United Kingdom 1979 1995 16 1.3306 2.07
United States 1979 1996 17 1.1071 0.63
average qualifiers 1979.5 1993.7 14.2 1.0960 0.67
source: Gottschalk & Smeeding (1998, figure 4, p. 56 and appendix tables A-2, p. 64); and own calculations
Social security transfers as percentage of GDP
year 1: year 2: variable year 1 variable year 2 index change per year
Australia 1981 1994 19.5 21.8 1.1179 0.18
Canada 1979 1994 9.6 15.2 1.5833 0.37
Denmark 1981 1994 17.8 22.0 1.2360 0.32
Finland 1979 1994 9.4 25.1 2.6702 1.05
France 1979 1994 18.6 23.3 1.2527 0.31
Germany 1979 1994 16.5 16.1 0.9758 -0.03
Ireland 1980 1993 12.6 15.4 1.2222 0.22
Italy 1979 1994 15.7 19.5 1.2420 0.25
Japan 1979 1993 9.8 12.1 1.2347 0.16
Netherlands 1979 1994 25.5 25.5 1.0000 0.00
Norway 1979 1991 15.5 20.5 1.3226 0.42
Sweden 1979 1994 17.6 24.9 1.4148 0.49
Switzerland 1982 1992 13.2 15.9 1.2045 0.27
United Kingdom 1979 1994 11.1 15.4 1.3874 0.29
United States 1979 1993 10.0 13.2 1.3200 0.23
average qualifiers 1979.5 1993.5 14.83 19.06 1.2855 0.30
source: Comparative Welfare State Data Set LIS / OECD (internet http://lissy.ceps.lu/compwsp.htm); and own calculations
Gross Replacement Rates
year 1: year 2: variable year 1 variable year 2 index  change per year
Australia 1981 1995 22.1 27.0 1.2217 1.58
Canada 1979 1995 25.6 27.2 1.0625 0.39
Denmark 1981 1995 54.2 67.0 1.2362 1.69
Finland 1979 1995 26.5 43.2 1.6302 3.94
France 1979 1995 24.0 37.4 1.5583 3.49
Germany 1979 1995 25.1 27.2 1.0837 0.52
Ireland 1979 1993 28.1 30.8 1.0961 0.69
Italy 1979 1995 1.0 19.3 19.3000 114.38
Japan 1979 1993 8.7 9.9 1.1379 0.99
Netherlands 1979 1995 47.5 45.8 0.9642 -0.22
Norway 1979 1991 19.9 38.9 1.9548 7.96
Sweden 1979 1995 25.1 27.2 1.0837 0.52
Switzerland 1981 1993 12.8 29.5 2.3047 10.87
United Kingdom 1979 1995 23.8 17.8 0.7479 -1.58
United States 1979 1993 11.7 11.9 1.0171 0.12
average qualifiers 1979.4 1994.2 23.74 30.67 1.2921 1.97
source: OECD (data provided by Glenn Cooper, may 2000); and own calculations
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Notes
∗ In an earlier stage of our research project on this topic we have benefited from discussions with, and helpful comments
from Erik Fjaerli, René Goudriaan, Thor Olaf Thoressen, Henk Vording, and participants of The Year 2000 International
Research Conference on Social Security, September 26th 2000, Helsinki. The views expressed as well as any remaining
shortcomings are, of course, our own responsibility. Another version of this paper has been published in International Tax
and Public Finance, volume 8 (4), 2001. This research is part of Leiden Social Security Incidence Project, which is
supported by a grant of Reaal Verzekering NV.
1 Several studies try, however, to overcome the cross-country data-differences. See e.g. Dollar and Kraay (2000). The advanced
econometric procedure used in their paper do not generate very precisely estimates for the adjustments needed (see the authors'
note 8). Atkinson and Brandolini (1999) therefore criticized this types of adjustments and this type of large "secondary"
datasets.
2 Presently there are a few countries for which panel data have been collected for ten years or more. Fully comparable data
are available for only the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands and for only a few data years (1985-1989).
Nevertheless, the approach by Headey et al. (1997) seems an attractive route in this kind of empirical research.
3 LIS is very useful for measuring differences in inequality at a point in time, but is less well suited for measuring changes in
inequality over time across countries (Smeeding, 2000). Ideally data collection on income inequality is both consistent
over time and across countries. However, such a project is daunting at this time (Atkinson et al. 2000: 1). In assessing
trends across countries one should be aware of noisy data due to definitional differences in income, definitional differences
in population coverage (immigrants), differences in survey collections practices, and differences in periodicity related to
the business cycle (Smeeding, 2000: 214-219).
4 We do not review conceptual and measurement issues which should be addressed in any cross national comparison of survey
based household income data (e.g. the definition of income, the unit of analysis, income sharing rules, the period of analysis,
and income data quality and measurement errors), although some of this issues are addressed in section 4.
5 On the other hand, the increases of real disposable income of social security beneficiaries had been large in the 1970’s.
6   An equivalence scale is a function that calculates adjusted income from income and a vector of household characteristics (cf.
Figini, 1998). The general form of these equivalence scales is given by the following expression:
     
ES
DW =
, where W is adjusted income, D is income (disposable income), S is size (number of persons in households)
and E is equivalence elasticity. E varies between 0 and 1. The larger E, the smaller are the economies of scale assumed by the
equivalence scales. Equivalence scales range from E=0 (no adjustment or full economics of scale) to E=1 (zero economies of
scale). Between these extremes, the range of values used in different studies is very large, strongly affecting measured
inequality. It has been shown that, within a wide range, choice of equivalence scales affects international comparisons of
income inequality to a wide extend. Alternatively adjustment methods would definitely affect the ranking of countries,
although the broad pattern remains the same (Atkinson et al. 1995: 52).
7 See for example Dalton (1936), Musgrave & Tun Thin (1948), Gillespie (1965), Kakwani (1977a, 1977b), Reynolds &
Smolenskey (1977), Kiefer (1984) and Silber (1994), and more recent analyses based on the Luxembourg Income Study
database (some of them are also listed in our references). See Smolensky et al. (1987) for a critical survey of efforts to
measure budget incidence.
8 This is consistent with other research we did, see Caminada and Goudswaard (1996).
9 The growth in the number of one-person households since 1981 has made the non-adjusted distribution of disposable
household income more unequal (cf. Trimp, 1999 and Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 1998:109).
10 See e.g. Gelauff & Graafland (1994, chapter 10 on  'Cutting back the welfare state').
